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I. INTRODUCTION
To most Americans, the purchase of a new vehicle is second only
to the purchase of a new home in terms of both price and excitement. If
the purchaser realizes, after only a few days of operation, that he has
purchased an inoperable or dangerously defective automobile, this
important purchase becomes a nightmare. He has purchased what has
universally become known as a "lemon." All the excitement associated
with the purchase of a new car or truck is completely soured. The
purchaser is then faced with the seemingly insurmountable task of seeking
redress from a faceless manufacturer and a dealer's uncooperative service
department. Unsatisfied and frustrated, the purchaser, if not completely
discouraged, retains an attorney in order to execute the gymnastic legal
feats required by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Then, after a
few years of expensive litigation, the persistent consumer, by now
completely disgusted with car dealers, manufacturers, attorneys, and the
entire legal system, perhaps breaks even, having gained only minimal
satisfaction and the desire to avoid any future car purchases.
The United States Congress addressed the purchasers' plight in
1974 by enacting the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Act (Magnuson-Moss).' Magnuson-Moss requires
manufacturers that offer written warranties to clearly label their warranties
as either full or limited and to simply and plainly explain the scope of the
warranties. Unfortunately, because the requirements placed upon the
1. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 101, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
2301-2312 (1988)). The Act requires that the manufacturer conspicuously label its warranty
as either a full or a limited warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1988). If it opts to give a full
warranty, the manufacturer must refund the purchase price or replace the vehicle after a
reasonable number of repair attempts. Id. § 2304(a)(4). If it opts to give a limited
warranty, the manufacturer decides for itself which parts will be warranted and the duration
of the warranty.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
manufacturers opting to offer a full warranty are so stringent, 2 most
manufacturers then began offering only limited warranties. 3
Once the inadequacies of Magnuson-Moss and the Uniform
Commercial Code remedies became apparent, the Ohio General Assembly
joined the rest of the nation' in 1987 by enacting its own lemon law.'
However, instead of merely providing an additional theory of liability for
the litigant consumer to place in its quiver alongside warranty, contract,
fraud, and Magnuson-Moss, the Ohio General Assembly purportedly also
provided a more accessible remedy by including provisions for
manufacturers' informal dispute resolution mechanisms. 6 This Note will
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a). This subsection requires a manufacturer to refund the
purchase price or to replace the vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts if the
vehicle is covered by a full warranty.
3. Congress enacted Magnuson-Moss in 1974, and by 1979, nearly 99% of all new cars
were sold with limited warranties. R. Coffinberger and L. Samuels, Legislative Responses
to the Plight of the New Car Purchasers, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 168, 172 (1985).
4. Nearly all the states and the District of Columbia have enacted their own versions of
lemon laws. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.300-360 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-
1261 to -1265 (1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (Deering 1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 42-12-101 to -107 (1984 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
179 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-1301 to -1309 (1990); FLA. STAT. §§ 681.10-.111 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §
490:2-313.1 (Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 1201-1208 (1988); IowA
CODE § 322E.1 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2419 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
367.840-.846 (Baldwin 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1941-1948 (West 1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1161-1169 (Supp. 1990); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-
1501 to -1504 (1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7N1/2 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp.
1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.1401-.1410 (1990); MINN. STAT. § 325F.665 (1990);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 63-17-151 to -165 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 407.560-.579 (1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -533 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-2701 to -2709
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598-751 to -791 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357-D:1
to :8 (1984 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-16A-1 to -9 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-07-16 to -22
(1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.315-
.375 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1951-1963 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 31-5.2-1 to -13 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-24-201 to -211 (1988); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-20-1
to -7 (1986 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4170-4181 (1984 & Supp. 1990);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.9 to -. 14 (1987 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§
19.118.005-.902 (Supp. 1988); W.VA. CODE §§ 46A-6A-l to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1990); WIS.
STAT. § 218.015 (1988); WYO. STAT. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1990).
5. 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 232 (Baldwin) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1345.71-.77 (Anderson Supp. 1988)).
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.77. This section provides as follows:
(A) The attorney general shall adopt rules for the establishment and qualification
of an informal dispute resolution mechanism to provide for the resolution of
warranty disputes between the consumer and the manufacturer, its' agent, or its
authorized dealer. The mechanism shall be under the supervision of the division of
consumer protection of the office of the attorney general and shall meet or exceed
the minimum requirements for an informal dispute resolution mechanism as
provided by the "Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act," 88 Stat. 2183, 15 U.S.C. 2301, and regulations adopted
thereunder.(B) If a qualified informal dispute resolution mechanism exists and the consumer
receives timely notification, in writing, of the availability of the mechanism with a
description of its operation and effect, the cause of action under section 1345.75 of
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examine the operation of these dispute resolution mechanisms and,
specifically, will determine whether they indeed provide a more expedient,
accessible means to obtain relief, or instead, merely constitute an
additional, technical condition precedent to civil commercial litigation.
II. OHIO'S LEMON LAW AND THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISM PROVISIONS
To understand the scope of the lemon laws, it is important to
understand which transactions trigger lemon laws. Ohio Revised Code
section 1345.72 provides:
If a new motor vehicle does not conform to any applicable express
warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the
manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer during the period
of one year following the date of original delivery or during the
first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever is earlier,
the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer shall make
any repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such
express warranty, notwithstanding the fact that the repairs are
made after the expiration of the appropriate time period.
7
Therefore, the vehicle must be new; owners of used cars are not
entitled to the protection of the lemon laws. Furthermore, the term
"motor vehicles" includes only passenger cars or noncommercial vehicles;
a vehicle other than a passenger car must be used exclusively for purposes
other than engaging in business for profit for the lemon laws to applys
In addition, the vehicle must carry with it a written express warranty,9 and
the vehicle must in some way not conform to the warranty. A
nonconformity is "any defect or condition which substantially impairs the
use, value, or safety of a motor vehicle and does not conform to the
express warranty of the manufacturer or distributor."t 0 The vehicle must
the Revised Code may not be asserted by the consumer until after the consumer has
initially resorted to the informal dispute resolution mechanism. If such a
mechanism does not exist, if the consumer is dissatisfied with the decision produced
by the mechanism, or if the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer fails to
promptly fulfill the terms determined by the mechanism, the consumer may assert a
cause of action under section 1345.75 of the Revised Code.
(C) Any violation of a rule adopted pursuant to division (A) of this section is an
unfair and deceptive act or practice as defined by section 1345.02 of the Revised
Code.
7. Id. § 1345.72(A).
8. Id. § 1345.71(D). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4501.01(H) (Anderson 1990).
9. "'Express warranty' and 'warranty' mean the written warranty of the manufacturer
or distributor of a new motor vehicle concerning the condition and fitness for use of the
vehicle, including any terms or conditions precedent to the enforcement of obligations under
the warranty." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.71(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
10. Id. § 1345.71(E).
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have accumulated less than eighteen thousand miles or be less than one
year old, and if there is a nonconformity, the consumer must report this
nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer.
If the consumer purchased a vehicle that does not conform to the
vehicle's express warranty, the manufacturer has the duty to repair the
vehicle so that it conforms to the warranty. 1 Then, if the manufacturer
or dealer is unable to conform the vehicle to the express warranty after a
reasonable number of repair attempts, 2 the consumer has the option to
receive a new, acceptable, conforming motor vehicle or, instead, to
receive all of the following:
1. The full purchase price, including, but not limited to, charges
for undercoating, transportation, and installed options;
2. [a]Il collateral charges, including but not limited to, sales tax,
license and registration fees, and similar government charges;
3. [a]ll finance charges incurred by the consumer; [and]
4. [aIll incidental damages, including any reasonable fees charged
by the lender for making or cancelling the loan.B
In light of the severity of the sanctions imposed, a dealer or
manufacturer is unlikely to voluntarily admit that the vehicle is defective.
Instead, a dispute between the consumer and the dealer is likely to arise,
and it is at this point that the overwhelmed consumer seeks support in the
remedial measures provided by the lemon laws.
Besides providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, the
lemon laws also facilitate private suits brought by complaining consumers.
II. Id. § 1345.72(A).
12. Ohio Revised Code § 1345.73 defines "a reasonable number of repair attempts" as
follows:
It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been
undertaken by the manufacturer, its dealer, or its authorized agent to
conform a motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty if, during the
period of one year following the date of original delivery or during the
first eighteen thousand miles of operation, whichever is earlier, any of the
following apply:
(A) Substantially the same nonconformity has been subject to repair
three or more times and continues to exist;
(B) The vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative
total of thirty or more calendar days;
(C) There have been eight or more attempts to repair any nonconformity
that substantially impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the
consumer;
(D) There has been at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity that
results in a condition that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
if the vehicle is driven, and the nonconformity continues to exist.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.73 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
In addition, the civil remedies provided in this section are not exclusive. Id. § 1345.75(B).
13. Id. § 1345.72(B).
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If a new car purchaser suffers any loss due to the car's nonconformity as
a result of the manufacturer's or dealer's failure to repair or replace the
vehicle or to refund the purchase price, then the purchaser may bring a
civil suit in a common pleas court and may be entitled to attorney's fees
and all court costs. 4 The statute requires any civil suit to be commenced
within two years of the expiration of the dealer's express warranty, but
this period of limitation is suspended beginning on the date that the
purchaser files a complaint with a qualified informal dispute resolution
mechanism and ending on the date of a decision by that mechanism.s If
the consumer receives timely, written notification from the manufacturer
that a qualified informal dispute resolution mechanism exists, the
consumer must resort to the manufacturer's qualified alternative dispute
resolution mechanism before filing a civil lawsuit. 6 As a practical matter,
the existence of a manufacturer's dispute resolution mechanism is not a
condition precedent to an ordinary civil lawsuit in Ohio because only one
manufacturer, Toyota, has had its mechanism formally qualified by the
Ohio Attorney General.' 7
Subsection A of section 1345.77 requires the Ohio Attorney
General to adopt rules for the establishment and qualification of
manufacturer dispute resolution mechanisms to provide for the resolution
of warranty disputes between the consumer and the manufacturer, its
agent, or its dealer." The consumer protection division of the Attorney
General's office must supervise the manufacturers' mechanisms, 9 and
each mechanism, to be qualified, must meet or exceed the minimum
requirements for an informal dispute resolution mechanism as provided by
Magnuson-Moss and its parallel regulations.' ° Pursuant to this statutory
mandate, the Ohio Attorney General promulgated Ohio Administrative
Code Chapters 109:4-4 and 109:4-5 on November 29, 1987,21 describing
the requirements of a dispute resolution mechanism entitled to certification
by the Attorney General.
Chapter 109:4-4 requires the manufacturer to fulfill a laundry list
of qualifications in order to have its dispute resolution mechanism
certified. Importantly, neither the statutes nor the Administrative Code
initially requires the manufacturer to create and maintain a certifiable
14. Id. § 1345.75(A).
15. Id. § 1345.75(C).
16. Id. § 1345.77(B).
17. Telephone interview with Theodore Barrows, Esq., Assistant Ohio Attorney
General, Consumer Protection Division (Mar. 4, 1991).
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.77(A) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. OHIo ADMIN. CODE §§ 109:4-4-01 to :4-5-06 (1988).
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dispute resolution mechanism. However, to be certified, the
Administrative Code first requires that the manufacturer meet certain
notice requirements. Specifically, the manufacturer must conspicuously
notify the consumer' of the mechanism's availability,=  its name,'
address, u telephone number, 2s and that the consumer must first resort to
the mechanism before initiating civil litigation 6 The manufacturer is also
required to outline in the warranty packet all pertinent details concerning
the dispute resolution mechanism,' and it must designate a contact person
accessible to the consumer. 2' In addition, the manufacturer must respond
promptly to information requests, 29 and upon notification of a mechanism's
decision, must in good faith perform the obligations required by that
decision. °
The mechanism itself must be funded and competently staffed "at a
level sufficient to ensure fair and expeditious resolution of all disputes,
and shall not charge consumers any fee for [its] use. "31 In addition,
although the manufacturer provides the arbitrators' salaries, the chapter
requires that the arbitrators be sufficiently insulated to eliminate any
improper influence by the manufacturer.32 The chapter also proscribes
arbitrator involvement or interest in a dispute, and no arbitrator may have
any direct involvement in the manufacture, distribution, sale, or service of
any motor vehicle.n
Procedurally, the chapter requires the manufacturer to promulgate
written procedures for its mechanism, which are to be made available
upon request. 34  In addition, immediately upon receipt of written
notification of a warranty dispute, the mechanism must notify the
consumer in writing that she must comply with the mechanism's
procedures before pursuing civil litigation6 The mechanism then
becomes an investigative body and gathers its own evidence, while
providing both parties with the opportunity to submit materials as
22. Id. § 109:4-4-03(C)(1).
23. Id. § 109:4-4-03(C)(2).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 109:4-4-03(C)(3).
27. Id. § 109:4-4-03(D).
28. Id. § 109:4-4-03(F)(1).
29. Id. § 109:4-4-03(F)(2).
30. Id. § 109:4-4-03(F)(3).
31. Id. § 109:4-4-04(A)(1).
32. Id. § 109:4-4-04(A)(2).
33. Id. § 109:4-4-04(B)(1).
34. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(1).
35. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(2).
[Vol. 6:2 1991]
OHIO LEMON LAWS
evidence.3 6 A consumer may, upon request, appear in person before the
board.-" The mechanism has sixty days in which to render a decision as
to liability and remedies in the form of a detailed opinion.3 Furthermore,
the chapter requires that a mechanism keep detailed records of the
disputes filed, resolved, settled, left unresolved, and ignored by the
manufacturer. 39  These statistics must be filed twice a year with the
Attorney General. 4
III. ANALYSIS
The alternative dispute resolution mechanism provisions contained
in the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio Administrative Codes represent
toothless directives to the new car manufacturer to establish a thorough
and expedient decision-making body to which the consumer may
comfortably resort and expect a fair and impartial resolution of warranty
dispute. While the Ohio General Assembly intended to provide more than
another theory of liability for the consumer, the provisions concerning a
manufacturer's alternative dispute resolution mechanism, while facially
demanding, require very little, if anything, of the manufacturer.
Certainly, the Revised Code required the Ohio Attorney General to
adopt Chapters 109:4-4 and 109:4-5 of the Ohio Administrative Code as
rules for the qualification and certification of the manufacturer's dispute
resolution mechanism. 41 The rules subsequently promulgated did indeed
erect stringent requirements to certify an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism for resolving warranty disputes. However, because neither the
Revised Code nor the Administrative Code requires that a manufacturer
actually upgrade its mechanism in order to meet the Code's requirements,
the manufacturer has no legal or practical incentive to install a
mechanism. This is not only obvious from the Code, but also from the
fact that, in the three years during which the provisions have been in
effect, only one major manufacturer, Toyota, has actually sought and
received attorney general certification for its mechanism, and that
certification was granted only as recently as September 1989.42 No other
manufacturer has even hinted at the possibility of upgrading its mechanism
to meet the Code's requirements, and upon criticism, the manufacturers
justifiably respond with the smug rhetorical, "Why should we?" The
36. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(3).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(5).
39. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(6).
40. Id. § 109:4-4-04(D)(5).
41. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.77(A) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
42. Telephone interview with Theodore Barrow, Esq., supra note 17.
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manufacturers have read the statutes and the regulations, and they
obviously understand what they do and do not require.
Indeed, the informal dispute resolution provisions are so stringent
in terms of staffing,0o compensation,44 notice to consumers, 45 reporting, 40
and speed,' 7 that the manufacturer has incentive to avoid seeking Attorney
General qualification. The manufacturer perceives the costs directly
associated with upgrading as clearly outweighing the benefits of having its
mechanism qualified by the Attorney General. Additionally, the Attorney
General's rules provide a number of obstacles through which the
manufacturer is required to navigate. If it fails to navigate these obstacles
and violates any of the rules, the violation is an unfair and deceptive act
or practice, which renders the manufacturer liable to the consumer for
treble damages and attorney's fees. 4
The objectionable aspect of the alternative dispute resolution
mechanism provisions is not their stringency; indeed, the Attorney
General's rules adequately strike a balance between the rights of the
consumer and the rights of the manufacturer. What is objectionable is
that the General Assembly places the applicability of the rules within the
discretion of the individual manufacturer. The rules are permissive, not
mandatory. Consequently, the manufacturer doing business with Ohio
consumers has resoundingly responded to the General Assembly's
invitation by avoiding the stringent rules.
Even though manufacturers are not required to certify their
programs with the Attorney General, and consequently their dispute
resolution bodies need not meet the standards of the Administrative Code
or the Magnuson-Moss regulations, the consumer may still use the
manufacturer's prgrams. The consumer may or may not receive a
satisfactory result. Importantly, the unsatisfied purchaser must be wary of
the pitfall inherent within the lemon law's statute of limitations.
Subsection C of Ohio Revised Code section 1345.75 provides that a
litigant must bring a lemon law suit within two years of the'expiration of
the express warranty term.49 The subsection provides further that, if a
litigant first files a complaint with an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism qualified pursuant to section 1345.77, the two-year statute of
limitations period is suspended from the date of that filing until the date of
43. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 109:4-4-04(A) (1988).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C).
46. Id. § 109:4-4-04(D)(5).
47. Id. § 109:4-4-04(C)(5).
48. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.77(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
49. Id. § 1345.75(C).
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a decision by the mechanism. s ° As noted earlier, only Toyota has an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism that has been qualified by the
Attorney General pursuant to section 1345.77. s' Therefore, filing
complaints with the Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, or Volkswagen
dispute resolution mechanisms does not toll the two-year statute of
limitations. Instead, the statutory period continues to run while the
complaint is pending.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The provisions in the Ohio statute relating to a manufacturer's
alternative dispute resolution mechanism are inadequate to strike a realistic
balance between the legal rights of the purchaser and the manufacturer
and dealer. The provisions have a considerable bite and stringently
require the manufacturer, once it qualifies its mechanism, to provide a
considerable number of procedural protections in order to provide the
consumer with an accessible, fair, insulated, and expedient forum in
which to resolve automobile warranty disputes. However, by virtue of
the simple fact that the manufacturer is in no way required to meet the
provisions of Chapters 109:4-4 and 109:4-5 of the Ohio Administrative
Code, those articulated requirements are worthless.
Ohio's lemon law should require automobile manufacturers doing
business in Ohio to qualify their alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
pursuant to section 1345.77 of the Revised Code and pursuant to Chapters
109:4-4 and 109:4-5 of the Administrative Code. Then, resort to a
manufacturer's alternative dispute resolution mechanism would be a truly
worthwhile means of avoiding the cost, technicalities, and burdens of
commercial civil litigation and not merely a distraction for the purchaser
unknowingly destined for the courtroom.
In addition, or in the alternative, Ohio should enact an additional
section or subsection to its lemon law that would establish a state-
operated, mandatory arbitration program. The statute should require the
Attorney General to promulgate additional implementing regulations to be
contained in the Ohio Administrative Code for the creation and operation
of the program. The statute itself should provide the consumer and the
manufacturer with the option of resorting to the program, but if either
party opts to do so, the other would be required to subject itself to the
program's jurisdiction. Results should be binding but appealable to a
common pleas court within a short period of time by either dissatisfied
party.
50. Id.
51. Telephone interview with Theodore Barrows, Esq., supra note 17.
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Such a state-operated arbitration program is by no means a novel
notion. Seven other states, after being faced with a situation similar to
Ohio's, have opted to shift the base of authority over alternative resolution
of warranty disputes from the manufacturer to the state. s' For example,
the initial Massachusetts lemon law went into effect in January 1984 with
substantive provisions nearly identical to Ohio's in terms of standards for
the refund or replacement of seriously defective new motor vehicles.'
The law as originally enacted also contained voluntary provisions for
manufacturer arbitration of lemon law claims,U very similar to Ohio's.
However, when no manufacturer participated in the voluntary program,
Massachusetts amended its law in 1985 to provide for a mandatory, state-
run arbitration program, the Massachusetts Lemon Law Arbitration
Program (LLAP), which became operational on April 23, 1986. ss
Massachusetts became one of the first states to provide its consumers with
state-run arbitration of lemon law disputes.56
Specifically, an office similar to Ohio's consumer protection
division of the attorney general's office, the Massachusetts Executive
Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (EOCABR),
administers the Massachusetts program s7 The Massachusetts statute, as
amended, requires the EOCABR to contract with a professional arbitration
firm to conduct arbitration hearings.-" Since 1986, the office has solicited
bids for the contract and chosen the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), a professional, nonprofit arbitration association. 9  The AAA
schedules arbitration hearings and provides a pool of over 300 trained
arbitrators thoroughly versed in the substantive statutory requirements of
Massachusetts' lemon law.60
Statistically, arbitrators operating within Massachusetts' state-run
arbitration program decided in favor of consumers in nearly two-thirds of
the cases heard through 1987, the last year for which statistics are
available. 6' Consumers have received more than $3.2 million in refunds
52. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, Vermont,
and Washington all have state-run arbitration programs. Abrams, New York Lemon Law
Arbitration Program: Annual Report - 1987, ARB. J., Sept. 1988, at 36, 38, n.1.
53. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 90, § 7NI/2 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (amended 1985).
54. Id.
55. MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 90, § 7NI/2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). See Gold,
Massachusetts Lemon Law Arbitration Program: 1987 Report, ARB. I., Sept. 1988, at 48,
49.
56. Gold, supra note 55, at 48.
57. Id.
58. MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 90 § 7N1/2 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); Gold,
supra note 55, at 53.
59. Gold, supra note 55, at 53.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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and replacements since the program began and $1.9 million in 1987
alone." After the creation and implementation of the Massachusetts
program, the number of complaints filed against manufacturers rose
dramatically, but since 1987, they have leveled off. In addition, the
reaction of manufacturers doing business in Massachusetts has shifted
markedly, as indicated by the fact that, in 1987, the percentage of cases
settled prior to arbitration more than doubled."
In 1986, the state of New York implemented both of this Note's
recommendations. In 1983, New York enacted its lemon law with
substantive provisions similar to Ohio's and with nearly identical
provisions for manufacturers' alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.,
However, almost immediately, the New York Attorney General's office
was flooded with complaints detailing the inadequacies of individual
manufacturers' alternative dispute resolution mechanisms," and, in
response, that office conducted an in-depth analysis of the manufacturers'
mechanisms." It concluded that most of the mechanisms did not comply
with the Magnuson-Moss provisions, its parallel Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) regulations, and with many of the procedural
requirements essential to a fair and expedient arbitration hearing.'
Specifically, the manufacturers did not permit the consumers to appear
before the boards, and most of the manufacturer-provided arbitrators did
not correctly apply New York's substantive lemon law provisions.'
Based upon these findings of inadequacy, New York amended its
lemon law in 1986.6 While the 1986 amendments do not go so far as to
require manufacturers doing business in New York to meet the Magnuson-
Moss requirements, the amendments do require that, if a manufacturer
creates an alternative warranty dispute resolution mechanism, the
manufacturer must meet the lemon law provisions, and therefore, must
meet the Magnuson-Moss requirements. 0
More importantly, New York amended its lemon law to become
almost identical to Massachusetts' in that the law now affords the
consumer the option of submitting lemon law disputes to a new alternative
arbitration mechanism established pursuant to regulations of the New York
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. N.Y. GEN. BUs. LAW § 198-a (amended 1986).
65. Abrams, supra note 52, at 38.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-a (MeKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991). See Abrams,
supra note 52, at 38.
70. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991).
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Attorney General's office.71 Pursuant to the amendments, if the consumer
opts to resort to the state-run arbitration program, once the consumer
submits its filing fee, the manufacturer is automatically amenable to the
program's jurisdiction. Again, as in Massachusetts, the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) was designated as program administrator
and has nearly 600 arbitrators available for the resolution of automobile
warranty disputes pursuant to the New York lemon law. 3 As suggested
in this Note, the decision by an arbitrator in New York is binding upon
both parties, but is subject to judicial review pursuant to New York's
rules of civil practice.74
It should be noted that both types of the New York alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms have been subject to constitutional attack,
and the Ohio General Assembly should act carefully if it chooses to
laterally adopt New York's provisions verbatim. Specifically, in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of America, Inc. v. New York, 75 a
plaintiff trade association brought a declaratory judgment action alleging
that the arbitration mechanism of the 1986 New York lemon law
amendments was unconstitutional on the grounds that a compulsory
arbitration program deprived the manufacturer of its constitutional right to
a jury trial, 76 that the program denied access to the jurisdiction of a New
York supreme court,n and that the program also constituted an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.7' All three contentions
were ruled meritless. 79 The New York court found first that a lemon law
dispute is equitable in nature in that it is mainly an action for restitution,
and therefore, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial.'"y
Secondly, the court held that there is no constitutional right of access to
the civil courts and that the legislature may establish alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms." Lastly, the court found that, in light of the
preserved high level of judicial supervision of the program, the legislature
did not unconstitutionally abdicate judicial responsibility.82
71. Id. § 198-a(k).
72. Id.
73. Abrams, supra note 52, at 39.
74. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991).
75. 146 A.D.2d 212, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1989).
76. Id. at 216, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div. 1989).
77. Id. at 218, 540 N.Y.S.2d 88, 891 (App. Div. 1989).
78. Id. at 219, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (App. Div. 1989).
79. Id. at 220-21, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (App. Div. 1989).
80. Id. at 216, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div. 1989).
81. Id. at 218, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (App. Div. 1989).
82. Id. at 219, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (App. Div. 1989).
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In another notable challenge, a plaintiff manufacturer in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturer's Association of the United States, Inc. v. Abrams,"3
filed an action for declaratory relief on the ground that an FTC negotiated
consent order preempted the New York lemon law compulsory arbitration
provisions. The consent order forced General Motors to implement a
third-party arbitration program to settle complaints of individual owners
relating to certain parts of General Motors vehicles.U The District Court
held that the consent order preempted the state's lemon law arbitration
provisions in so far as a consumer attempts to trigger the provisions to
settle a dispute concerning parts covered by the consent decree.' On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and held that the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the applicable FTC Regulations do not preempt the
New York laws concerning informal dispute resolution mechanisms. 6
With the above considerations in mind, Ohio should join the other
seven jurisdictions with state-run lemon law arbitration programs.
Otherwise, the Ohio consumer may use the lemon law only as an alternate
theory of liability in civil commercial litigation, an endeavor too costly for
most consumers. The lemon law should provide more than an alternate
theory of liability. It should also provide the consumer with an
accessible, fair, and expedient forum that actually applies the substantive
provisions of the lemon law. Currently, the Ohio lemon law provides
only an additional remedy, and until it is revised to provide access to a
simple dispute resolution procedure as well, the consumer is still at a
disadvantage.
D. Lewis Clark, Jr.
83. 697 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 899 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1122 (1991).
84. Id. at 728-29.
85. Id.
86. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. Abrams, 899 F.2d 1315
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1122 (1991).

